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I. Preamble
The establishment of an international criminal justice system
represents an interesting subject for European scholars. There is an
ever-increasing awareness that the European unification process
cannot be considered complete until the European Union gives
birth to a common justice system, especially in the field of
criminal law. Common action is necessary to adequately respond
to criminal activity that is becoming both more organized and
more transnational. In addition to these considerations, European
scholars have recognized the benefits of an effective international
criminal justice system as a fundamental means of promoting and
maintaining peace. In addition, European countries have joined the
majority of the international community in seeking strategies to
prevent the commission of international crimes and to punish
persons responsible for committing them.
History shows that the road to establishing an International
Criminal Tribunal is full of obstacles. Quantitatively, failures in
this field are more numerous than successes. Nevertheless, in the
last ten years the tide has shifted and new systems have been
created at both international and European levels.' First, the United
Nations Security Council established two ad hoc international
tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR). Additionally, on July 17, 1998, the
Plenipotentiaries Conference held in Rome approved the Statute of
the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), an agreement
that may be considered the most important result obtained by the
international community in the field of international criminal
* Ph.D., 2000, University of Bologna; Attorney at Law.
** Professor of Criminal Procedure, University of Bologna; Lecturer in Criminal
Procedure, L.U.I.S.S. Guido Carli, Rome.
I In Europe, the most important step is the proposal currently being considered by
the European Parliament for a European Prosecution Office for the defense of the
European Union's financial interests. See generally JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION-THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD PILLAR (J. Monar & J. Morgan
eds., 1995); THE THIRD PILLAR OF THE EUROPEAN UNION--COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS
OF JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS (J. Monar & J. Morgan eds., 1994); POSSIBILITA E LIMITI
DI UN DIRITO PENALE COMMUNITARIO (L. Picotti ed., 1998); PROSPETTIVE Di UN DiRirro
PENALE EUROPEO (G. Grasso ed., 1998).
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justice.2
From a European perspective, the most interesting
international criminal justice system is the ICTY. The ICTY is not,
however, a European criminal justice institution. The United
Nations created the ICTY in 1993 as a subsidiary instrument for
achieving and maintaining peace in the Balkans Region.' The
decision to establish this ICTY was not made by European states
alone, but instead was supported by the international community
and by the United States.'
The ICTY is significant to Europeans for two reasons. First, it
is located in Western Europe, at the Hague in the Netherlands.' Its
roots and its very existence are strictly related to the civil war in
the former Yugoslavia, a European tragedy whose causes are
interlaced with the history of many European countries.6
To a criminal procedure student, international criminal justice
presents two interesting aspects. On the one hand, international
tribunals can be considered a laboratory where different cultures
and procedural methods are merged. Many unique facets of
international tribunals stem from attempts to blend the two
predominant western juridical traditions, civil law and common
law. These international experiments may serve as models for
European countries attempting to reform their domestic criminal
justice systems. For example, in 1989, a new Italian Code of
2 See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter ROME STATUTE]. The Rome Statute, however, is
not yet in force. Article 126 of the Statute states that it will become effective after the
deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification. Id. art. 126, 37 I.L.M. at 1068. By
December 2000, only twenty-one countries had ratified the Statute.
3 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & P. MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 202 (1996).
4 MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 51-73 (1997). For the historical
and political circumstances that provided general international consent for the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical
Survey, in A.I.D.P., ICC Ratification and National Implementation Legislation, 13-14
(1999).
I BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 3, at 209.
6 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 18-22 (1995).
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Criminal Procedure entered into force, attempting to graft
adversarial characteristics onto the inquisitorial Italian criminal
process. Before the reform, the Italian Code had been based
exclusively on the continental European civil law systems,
historically influenced by the French Code Napolon. The reform
represented a significant break with Italian tradition. It did not
succeed completely because Italian courts have been reluctant to
accept and to conform to the new adversarial model. For this
reason, the study of the new international criminal tribunals is an
exciting prospect for Italian scholars. Many of the procedural
problems handled by these tribunals are similar to those examined
by the Italian courts, especially with regard to the law of
evidence.'
The second aspect of interest in the international criminal
justice system is the new shape of the legality principle emerging
from the practice of the international tribunals. For a civil law
jurist, it is unusual to have many different sources of criminal law.
Sources of criminal law for the international tribunals include
statutory law, international treaties, customary law, and case law. 8
In some ways, international criminal law appears to be a complex
patchwork composed of different pieces. This conception of the
legality principle is a new one for many European jurists and
therefore is the object of much study.
Developments in the field of international criminal justice will
have far-reaching impacts on the international community as a
whole and for individual states within that community. This work
chronicles many of those developments and forecasts the impact
they are likely to have. The second part of this paper is a concise
historical perspective on attempts to establish international
tribunals.9 The third and fourth parts focus on the ICTY'0 and on
7 See infra notes 169-287 and accompanying text.
8 Case law includes decisions by the Nuremberg and the ad hoc International
Tribunals, as well as those of national courts called to judge international criminal cases.
Example of the latter types of cases are: the Eichman case decided by an Israeli court,
the Papon case decided by a French court and the Priebke case decided by an Italian
Court. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION (1999).
9 See infra notes 9-90 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 91-170 and accompanying text.
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the Rome Statute." As regards the latter, this article gives a
general overview of the criminal procedure established therein.
II. Major Developments in the History of International
Criminal Jurisdiction
A. Historical Antecedents
Five centuries ago, the first international criminal court
brought to justice a party responsible for what today would be
characterized as international crime (in this case, as a crime
against humanity).'2 In 1474, an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal composed of twenty-eight judges from Alsace, Germany
and Switzerland, with a presiding judge from Austria, tried and
convicted Peter von Hagenbach, the Burgundian Governor of
Breisach."3 Hagenbach was accused of many crimes, including
murder, rape, perjury and other crimes in violation of "the laws of
God and man," during his occupation of the town of Breisach. "
Hagenbach had acted on behalf of Charles, the Duke of Burgundy,
at a time when there were no hostilities. 5 At the end of the trial,
von Hagenbach was sentenced to death. 6
Gustav Moynier of Switzerland made the first proposal for a
permanent international criminal tribunal in modem history more
than a century ago. 17 Horrified by the atrocities committed by both
sides in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, he proposed the
establishment of an international criminal court in January 1872. ."
The purpose of the court was to deter violations of the Geneva
Convention of 1864 and to bring to justice anyone responsible for
See infra notes 171-297.
12 See GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAWS As APPLIED BY COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 462-66 (1968).
13 Id. at 463.
14 Id. at 465.
15 Id. at 462-63.
16 Id. at 466.
11 Louise Arbour, The Need for an Independent and Effective Prosecutor in the
Permanent International Criminal Court, 17 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 207, 208
(1999); Gustave Moynier, Note sur la crdation d'une institution judiciaire intdrnationale
propre a prevenir et a riprimer les infractions a la Convention de Gendve, BULL. INT'L,
No. 11, 122 (1872).
1 Arbour, supra note 17, at 208-09.
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such violations. 9
Immediately after the end of the first World War, on January
25, 1919, the Paris Peace Conference appointed the Commission
on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and of the
Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs
of War (1919 Peace Conference Commission)." The 1919 Peace
Conference Commission proposed that an ad hoc tribunal be
established to try persons responsible for violations of the laws of
war and the laws of humanity.2' The commission documented
many categories of offenses against the laws and customs of war,
including the deliberate bombardment of undefended places, and
attacks against hospital ships by the Germans.22 This proposal,
however, was rejected in favor of adding provisions in the
Versailles Treaty for an ad hoc international tribunal to try Kaiser
Wilhelm II for "a supreme offence [sic] against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties." '23 Additionally, the Treaty of
S~vres provided for the prosecution of Turkish war criminals as a
result of the massacre of over a million Armenians by Turkish
authorities." However, no international tribunal was ever
established for this purpose. Instead, Kaiser Wilhelm was given
sanctuary in the Netherlands and the allies consented to the trial of
the Germans accused before the German Supreme Court sitting in
Leipzig.25 Out of the 896 Germans accused of war crimes by the
Allies, only twelve were tried; and of the twelve, only six were
convicted.26 The Turks received amnesty for their crimes by the
Treaty of Lausanne, which replaced the Treaty of Sevres.27
19 Id.
20 M. Cherif Bassiouni, From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court, 10 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 11,
14(1997).
21 D. Matas, Prosecuting Crimes against Humanity: The Lessons of World War I,
13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 86, 87 (1989).
22 Id.
23 Bassiouni, supra note 20, at 12.
24 V. N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The
World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J.
INT'L L. 221, 281 (1989).
25 Id. at 316.
26 Id. at 317.
27 Id. at 314-15.
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B. The Nuremberg Precedent
The creation of the first effective international criminal
tribunal of the twentieth century dates back to the conclusion of
World War II. In 1941, the Allies decided to prosecute and punish
those persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian
law.28 In October 1943, the Allies set up the United Nations
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, which issued the
Moscow Declaration. The Moscow Declaration stated that after
the war, German and Japanese political and military leaders
responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
conducting aggressive war would be brought to trial for these
offenses.29 In August 1945, France, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the Soviet Union met in London and
established an agreement providing for the establishment of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.30 The Nuremberg
Tribunal was created to try the highest ranking German officials
accused of crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.'
According to the Nuremberg Charter, each of the four
victorious allied powers appointed one of the judges and one of
the four chief prosecutors.32 The chief prosecutors had the duty of
preparing the indictments and drafting the rules of procedure for
the Nuremberg Tribunal so that they could be approved by its
members.33 It is interesting to note that this provision does not
appear in either the Statute creating the ICTY or the Statute
28 G. Vassalli, 1l Tribunale internazionale per i crimini commessi nei territori della
ex-Jugoslavia, LEG. PEN. 335 (1994).
29 See ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987); ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG
(1983); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR (1992); ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1983); A. Wievorka,
Le procs de Nuremberg et d'Eichmann en perspective, in JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE DE
NUREMBERG A LA HAYE ET ARUSHA 23-27 (A. Destexhe & M. Foret eds.,1997); Otto
Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg 18 Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 333 (1965); C.
Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg
Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 237 (1994).
30 TUSA & TUSA, supra note 29, at 84-85.
31 Id. at 33-48.
32 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 10.
33 Id. at 7.
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creating the International Criminal Court, both of which mandate
that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence be drafted by Tribunal
judges and not by the Office of the Prosecutor.
The Nuremberg Tribunal was not bound by technical rules of
evidence and could admit any evidence that it deemed to have
probative value. This evidentiary provision does appear in the
rules for the present International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia34 and in the drafting of the statute establishing
an International Criminal Court." Moreover, the Nuremberg
judges had the power to require the presence and the testimony of
witnesses, to interrogate defendants, and to compel the production
of documents and other evidence.36 In other words, the Nuremberg
judges could provide for the admission and the gathering of
evidence ex officio, as is done in the inquisitorial system."
The Nuremberg Charter and Rules of Procedure tried to blend
and balance elements of the Continental European system, which
is primarily inquisitorial, and the Anglo-American adversarial
system. 8 Generally, under the European inquisitorial system, most
of the documentary and testimonial evidence is presented to an
examining magistrate who assembles it in a dossier. 9 Copies of the
magistrate's dossier are provided to the defendant and to the court
prior to trial.4" The court, either on its own motion or at the request
of one of the parties, can question witnesses directly; furthermore,
cross-examination by opposing counsel is rare. In the Anglo-
34 JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA 417 (2000). This provision is
incorporated into Rule 90. Id.
35 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 69, 37 I.L.M. at 1041-42.
36 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 6.
37 Id.
38 Id.; See generally M.R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1995); M.R.
DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986). In Italy there is a vast
field of literature on the differences between the accusatorial and inquisitorial system.
See F. CORDERO, IDELOGIE DEL PROCESO PENALE 167 (1966); L. FERRAJOLI, DIRITTO E
RAGIONE: TEORIA DEL GARANTISMO PENALE 572-87 (1989); P. FERRUA, STUDI SUL
PROCESSO PENALE, 11 (1992); P. FERRUA, STUDI SUL PROCESSO PENALE, I (1990); G.
Illuminati, Accusatorio E Inquisitorio (Sistema), in ENC. GIUR. TRECCANI 1 (1988).
39 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 6.
40 Id. at 6-7.
41 Id.
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American system, by contrast, the indictment contains only a
summary of the facts alleged and the evidence is presented in
court by lawyers who examine and cross-examine the witnesses. 2
Mixing elements from both systems, the Nuremberg Charter
required, for instance, that the defendants testify as witnesses on
their own behalf, contrary to Continental practice. 3 Contrary to
Anglo-American practice, defendants could also make an unsworn
statement at the end of the trial." Moreover, the Nuremberg
Charter required, contrary to the Anglo-American practice, that the
indictment detail the specific charges against the defendants and
include any supporting documents. 5 Upon conviction of a
defendant, the Nuremberg Tribunal was authorized to impose any
punishment it considered to be just, including the death penalty,
and its judgments were not subject to any review. 6
Nevertheless, the Nuremberg Charter, in order to ensure a fair
trial, guaranteed certain minimum rights to the person accused.
Those rights included: the right to be informed of the indictment at
a reasonable time before trial, the right to give any relevant
explanation to the charges, the right to translation of proceedings,
the right to assistance of counsel, and the right to present evidence
and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution. 7 At
the same time, the Nuremberg Charter limited the rights of the
accused by providing for trials in absentia, and precluding any
challenges relating to the Nuremberg Tribunal or its judges." Of
the twenty-two German officials who were tried at Nuremberg,
nineteen were found guilty and twelve were sentenced to death. 9
The jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal has constituted
the main legal basis for over a thousand subsequent war crimes
trials conducted by military tribunals in occupied zones in
42 Id. at 6-7.
43 Id. at 7.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 10.
41 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 6 (1995).
48 Id.
49 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 10.
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Germany and in the liberated or allied nations. " Japanese war
criminals accused of crimes after World War II were tried before
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo
Tribunal), whose Charter was based largely on the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal."'
The Nuremberg Charter and Judgment are among the most
significant developments in international law in this century.
Today, the Nuremberg precedent continues to stand for the
principle of individual accountability for the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 2 However, the trial before
the Nuremberg Tribunal was not free from criticism. It was a
victor's tribunal before which only the defeated were called to
account for violations of international humanitarian law. 3 The
defendants were prosecuted and punished for crimes expressly
defined in an instrument adopted by the victors at the conclusion
of the war, thus after the commission of the alleged criminal act, in
violation of the established legal principle nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine praevia lege. From this perspective, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials were technically a sophisticated method of
exercising vengeance against the enemy. Perhaps this system was
not unrelated to the ancient Roman practice of spreading salt over
the ruins of the villages defeated by Roman armies. Moreover, in
the absence of a clearly articulated international standard, the
Nuremberg Tribunal relied on limited procedural rules drawn from
general principles recognized by different legal systems. 4
Notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms, it would be
unfair to judge this precedent too rigorously. In fact, the
Nuremberg Tribunal led to other significant developments in
international criminal law in the years following World War II.
The principles recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment
were unanimously affirmed by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1946." The Nuremberg Charter's definition of
persecution as a crime against humanity led to the adoption of the
50 Id.
51 R.H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 20-21 (1971).
52 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 11.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 11.
55 Id. at 13-14.
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide in 1948, a convention that recognizes the possibility of
the trial of alleged perpetrators before an international tribunal. 6
Moreover, the definition of war crimes contained in the
Nuremberg Charter was codified and further developed in the four
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims adopted in
1949."7 The Geneva Conventions require State-parties to bring
persons alleged to have committed or ordered "grave breaches" of
humanitarian law, regardless of their nationality, to trial before a
national court or, if possible, before an international tribunal."
C. The Legal and Factual Circumstances That Led to the
Establishment of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia
Two converging factors compelled the international
community, and particularly the Security Council, to draft the
ICTY Statute. 9 First, widespread media coverage focused
attention not only on the atrocities committed in the former
Yugoslavia, but also on the repeated failure of the international
community to induce a negotiated peace between the warring
parties.' Second, the major world powers recognized a common
interest in punishing the individuals who committed such
atrocities.61 The decision to establish the tribunal was the result of
a series of steps taken by the Security Council beginning in the
summer of 1992.62
56 See generally W. Shabas, Article 6 Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ARTICLE By ARTICLE 27 (0.
Triffterer ed. 1999) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE]; Raphael
Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947).
17 SCHARF, supra note 4, at 14.
58 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 64-69.
19 Id. at 17. For a history of the establishment of the International Criminal Court,
see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Establishing an International Criminal Court: Historical
Survey, 149 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1995) and M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher Blakesley,
The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992).
60 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 17.
61 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780: INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2 (1996).
62 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 17.
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In 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence
from Yugoslavia without assuring the security of the 500,000
Serbs living within their borders.63 It was feared that Serbs living
in an independent Croatia and Slovenia might fall victim to
atrocities similar to those committed during World War II when
Ustashi, a genocidal Croat organization, exterminated nearly one
million Serbs in Croatia.' These concerns were sufficiently grave
to rally support for an aggressive response. Slobidan Milosevic, at
that time not yet President of Yugoslavia, began by sending the
Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army into Slovenia. 6 That
was the beginning of the most recent Yugoslav tragedy. One year
later, in 1992, the war was extended to Bosnia.66
In 1992, international organizations began observing numerous
gross violations of international humanitarian law occurring in
Bosnia. 67 In just 18 months, approximately 150,000 murders were
perpetrated, particularly in Sarajevo where more than 10,000
persons died in two years, 2,500 of whom were children.68 The
Secretary-General of the United Nations reported to the Security
Council that the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with support from
the Yugoslav Army, were "making a concerted effort ... to create
ethnically pure regions" in the republic, and that the "techniques
used are the seizure of territory by military force and intimidation
of the non-Serb population."69 Many people were tortured and
killed in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi concentration camps of
World War II. Although Serb forces committed most of these
atrocities, the reports indicate that all ethnic groups engaged in the
conflict committed abuses.7 °
63 Id. at 19.
64 Id. at 18-19.
65 Id. at 19.
66 Id. at 19-20.
67 Id.
68 Vassalli, supra note 28, at 341.
69 1 MOIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 22 (quoting Further Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749, 5, U.N. Doc. S/23900
(1992)).
70 Id. at 22.
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D. The Response of the Security Council
By means of Resolution 780, the Security Council requested
that the Secretary-General establish a Commission of Experts to
provide him its conclusions on the evidence of "grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions and other violations of the international
humanitarian law" committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.71 In the aforementioned Resolution, the Security
Council expressed alarm at the continuing reports of mass killings
and the inhumane practice of ethnic cleansing in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia. 2
Within a few months, the Commission of Experts nominated
by the Secretary-General presented a report in which it concluded
that grave breaches and other violations of international
humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia. 73 The Commission defined the relatively new
term of "ethnic cleansing," in the context of the Yugoslav conflict,
as "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area."7 It
concluded that ethnic cleansing had been performed "by means of
murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial
executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of civilian
population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and
deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians."7 ' The Commission further
concluded that this practice of ethnic cleansing constituted a crime
against humanity as well as the crime of genocide as defined in the
Genocide Convention. 6 It also determined that ethnic cleansing
could be identified with specific war crimes.77
The Commission of Experts discussed the establishment of an
ad hoc international criminal tribunal to deal with the violations in
71 Id. at 24-25 (quoting S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47' Sess., 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/780 (1992)).
72 Id. at 22.
73 Id. at 28.
74 Id. (referring to U.N. Doc. S/25274, 1 55).
15 Id. at 28-29 (referring to U.N. Doc. S25274, 56).
76 Id. at 29.
77 Id.
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the Former Yugoslavia."8 While expressing the opinion that "it
would be for the Security Council or another competent organ of
the United Nations to establish such a tribunal," the Commission
"observe[d] that such a decision would be consistent with the
direction of its work."79 Considering the fact that the Commission
was presided over by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, the
preeminent scholar of the international criminal justice system,
such a suggestion appeared to be an inevitable conclusion.
In February 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution
808 in which it established an international tribunal "for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991. "80 On May 25, 1993, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
unanimously adopted the Statute of the International Tribunal,8' as
proposed by the Secretary-General in Resolution 827.82
The Security Council excluded the treaty approach to
addressing the situation because it presented too many difficulties
in terms of the time required to negotiate and conclude the treaty.83
Thus, the Security Council relied instead on Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. Article 41 of that chapter of the Charter
provides that "[tlhe Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions."8 ' Although the Security Council is not
expressly authorized to establish a war crimes tribunal, the Charter
is interpreted as giving the Security Council the powers necessary
78 Id.
79 Id. (referring to U.N. Doc. S25274, 74).
80 Id. at 31 (quoting S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (1993)).
81 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art. 27,
U.N. Doc.S/25704/Annexes (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
82 Id. at 33 (quoting S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993)).
83 Id. at 40.
84 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
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to maintain international peace and security."
Recently, one scholar advanced the opinion that the legal basis
for the establishment of the ICTY is found in the common tacit
consent expressed by the international community.86 According to
this theory, Chapter VII is not considered a sufficient element for
ensuring the legality of such a Tribunal, because Article 41 of the
United Nations Charter does not mention the power to create a
jurisdictional organ as a subsidiary of the Security Council.
However, it must be noted that in the ICTY's first decision, the
Chamber declared that the legal basis of the Tribunal existence
was founded in Article 41 of the U.N. Charter.8
7
The establishment of an international tribunal was thus
considered consistent with the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.8 Particularly, the Security
Council decided that a neutral tribunal capable of prosecuting and
punishing individuals would provide an effective deterrence to
further atrocities.89
85 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 42.
86 M. VITUCCI, IL TRIBUNALE AD Hoc PER LA Ex JUGOSLAVIA E IL CONSENSO
DEGLI STATI (1998).
87 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, IT -
94 -1, U 2,7, 19, & 35 (ICTY Aug. 10, 1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty. See
also G. Arangio-Ruiz, The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the
Former Territory of Yugoslavia and the Doctrine of Implied Powers of the United
Nations, in DAI TRIBUNALI PENALI INTERNAZIONALI AD HOC A UNA CORTE PERMANENTE
31 (F. Lattanzi & E. Sciso eds., 1996); M. Balboni, Da Norimberga alla Corte penale
internazionale, in CRIMINI INTERNAZIONALI TRA DIRITTO E GIUSTIZIA. DAI TRIBUNALI
INTERNAZIONALI ALLE COMMISSIONI VERITA E RICONCILIAZIONE 15-18 (G. Illuminati, L.
Stortoni & M. Virgilio eds., 2000) [hereinafter CRdMINI INTERNAZIONALI TRA DiRITFO E
GIUSTIZIA]; R. Charvin, Premidres observations sur la crgation du Tribunal Permanent
international de la resolution du Conseil de Sdcurite del Nations Unies, in I DIRITi
DELL'UOMO. CRONACHE E BATrAGLIE 382 (1993); T. Meron, The Case for War Crimes
Trials in Yugoslavia, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 122 (1993); A. P61let, Le tribunal criminel
international pour 'ex Jougoslavie. Poudre aux yeux ou avancge decisive?, in REVUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 7 (1994); P. Picone, Sul fondamento giuridico del
Tribunale penale internazionale per la ex lugoslavia, in LA COMUNITA' INTERNAZIONALE
3 (1996); G. Vassalli, supra note 25, at 335.
88 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 43-44.
89 Id. at 44.
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E. The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda and the Approval of the International
Criminal Court Statute
In 1994, one year after the establishment of the ICTY, the
Security Council passed Resolution 955, creating the ICTR. It has
jurisdiction over international crimes committed in the territory of
Rwanda between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994. The
Rwanda Tribunal is a sort of "Siamese twin" to the ICTY, because
the bodies share both an Office of the Prosecutor and an Appeal
Chamber.0
The ICTY became effective in 1994, just after the Security
Council appointed Mr. Richard Goldstone to be the Tribunal's first
Prosecutor." The judges were elected by the General Assembly of
the United Nations." Approximately six years have passed since
the Tribunal became effective. The Prosecutor has opened thirty-
two cases and indicted more than fifty suspects. The Chambers
have pronounced sixteen judgments, four of which have been
already decided by the appeal Chamber and are therefore
definitive. So far, these results cannot be criticized in terms of
either efficiency or fairness.
The establishment of the ICTY, along with the creation of the
ICTR, served as a fundamental step toward the establishment of an
international criminal court. The experiences of these ad hoc
tribunals have demonstrated both the need for and the feasibility of
establishing a permanent international criminal court. As Mr.
Graham T. Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor to the ICTY, said:
The Tribunals have achieved remarkable results,
90 See MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 47. There are many interesting questions
addressed in the judgments of the Rwanda Tribunal. For example, the Akayesu
Judgement establishes the relationship between sexual violence and genocide. Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, 96-4-T, paras. 507-08 (ICTR Sept. 2, 1998) available at http://www.ictr.org.
The Kambanda case chronicles the use of the guilty plea before an international tribunal.
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 97-23-S, § B (ICTR Sept. 4, 1998) available at
http://www.ictr.org.
91 KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF
THE HAGUE 15 (1996).
92 Id.
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although they are far from perfect. They took some time to
get started and they have been starved, even today, of
adequate and necessary resources. Yet, despite their
imperfections and at times insurmountable difficulties,
they have demonstrated that it is possible to create, at the
international level, a fully-functioning criminal justice
system, and they have confirmed it, effecting arrests of
indicted accused, holding fair trials, and dispensing a
satisfactory standard of justice which is open to public
scrutiny.93
Lessons learned from the success of the ad hoc war crimes
tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda fueled the drive
for a permanent international criminal court. With the media
coverage they received, the tribunals focused public attention on
bringing war criminals to justice and taught the international
community what it takes to create an international criminal court.
In 1994, in the same period during which the ad hoc tribunals
were being created, the Security Council charged the International
Law Commission to propose and elaborate the first draft statute
for the establishment of an international criminal court. In 1995,
the United Nations General Assembly established an ad hoc
committee to work on the draft proposed by the International Law
Commission. In 1996, the United Nations charged a Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) with preparing a new draft statute for an
international criminal court. In 1997, the PrepCom called for a
diplomatic conference to be held in Rome to adopt a convention
establishing an international criminal court. Finally, on July 17,
1998, the Rome Statute, subscribed by 120 States, was approved.
III. A Legal Analysis of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia
A. The Crimes Defined by the Statute
The ICTY Statute, adopted by Security Council Resolution
827, lists the crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction. The
93 Graham T. Blewitt, International and National Prosecutions in REINING IN
IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIRACUSA CONFERENCE, 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998
155, 155 (1998).
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ICTY Statute also provides general principles of substantive
criminal law and procedure and establishes the general structure of
the ICTY." The Statute does not dictate the details of the
functioning of the ICTY, but rather authorizes the judges to
undertake this task by adopting Rules of Procedure and Evidence."
The ICTY Statute specifically establishes the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal with respect to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, war crimes including violations of the laws or
customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 6
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute defines crimes related to grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The list includes willful
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, extensive destruction and
appropriation of property not justified by military necessity, and
taking civilians as hostages.97 One problem raised by this provision
is the exact meaning of "inhuman treatment." In the Aleksovski
Judgment,98 the ICTY, referring to inhuman treatment, stated that
"it is not necessary for the act to directly harm the physical or
mental well-being of the victim. It is enough that the act causes
real and lasting suffering to the individual."99
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute is related to war crimes."'° The
text is based primarily on the Nuremberg Charter, as applied by
the Nuremberg Tribunal. °' The Nuremberg Tribunal recognized
the Nuremberg Charter's definition of war crimes as "declaratory
of the laws and customs of war."'0 2 Violations include, but are not
94 ICTY Statute, supra note 81.
95 Id. art. 15.
96 Id. art. 1-10.
97 Id. art. 2.
98 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, para. 56 (ICTY June 25, 1999) available
at http://www.un.org/icty.
99 G. Irving & A. Dare Draper, The Modern Pattern of War Criminality, in WAR
CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1996);
GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ch. 39
(1968); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Conventions Under
the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 8
RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 185 (1977).
'oo ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 3.
'0' 1 MoPRRs & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 69.
102 U.N., THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL: HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS 83 (1949).
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limited to, employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, attack or bombardment
of undefended towns, and plunder of public or private property.'
3
The most significant crimes in the ICTY Statute are those
defined by Articles 4 and 5, genocide and crimes against humanity
respectively." "Genocide means any act committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group." ' These acts may include killing members of the group,
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group, and forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. 6 The
provisions of the Statute dealing with genocide are drawn word for
word from Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, signed in Paris on
December 9, 1948. '07
When the Security Council established the ICTY, it referred
explicitly to the "practice of ethnic cleansing including for the
acquisition and the holding of territory."'' 8 Judge Riad, as part of
the Srebrenica indictment, 10 9 confirming the second indictment
against Radovan Karazdic and Ratko Mladic, referred to "ethnic
cleansing" as a form of genocide: "the policy of ethnic cleansing
presents in its ultimate manifestation, genocidal
characteristics," as they may be inferred from the gravity of "the
mass killings of Muslims which occurred after the fall of
Srebrenica in July 1995, which were committed in circumstances
manifesting an almost unparalleled cruelty." ' 10
103 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 3.
"04 Id. art. 4.
1"5 Id.
106 Id.
107 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 86.
'08 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
109 Prosecutor v. Radovan Karazdic and Ratko Mladic, IT-95-18-I, (ICTY Nov. 16,
1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty. The ICTY often refers to a case by the name
of the prison camp involved, or, as in the present case, by the name of the town where
the crimes were committed.
"I0 Id.
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Article 5 of the ICTY Statute concerns crimes against
humanity, including murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political,
racial and religious grounds, and other inhuman acts. ' The
Secretary-General noted in his report that "crimes against
humanity were first recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the
Nuremberg Tribunal .... Crimes against humanity are aimed at
any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether
they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal
in character."' 12 In the Jelisic Judgment,"3 the ICTY, referring to
the sub-characterization of "other inhumane acts" contained in
Article 5, stated that the notion carries a meaning equivalent to
that of "inhuman treatment" as defined in relation to grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Article 2 of the Statute of
the Geneva Conventions."'
B. Structure of the Tribunal and Elements of Criminal
Procedure
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, along with the ICTY
Statute, provide for simple and expeditious, but fair trials. As the
Nuremberg Charter did previously, they try to balance the rights of
the accused with the interests of the international community. The
Rules incorporate most of the applicable standards relating to
criminal justice that the United Nations advocated, including the
fair trial provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The Tribunal's rules also ban the death penalty, in
keeping with United Nations pronouncements on this matter.'
Likewise, the rules declare inadmissible any evidence obtained as
a result of torture, in conformity with the relevant United Nations
I ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 5.
I2 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993).
113 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10, (ICTY Dec. 14, 1999) available at
http://www.un.org/icty.
114 Id. para. 52.
"15 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IT/32/Rev. 3, Rule 95 (Jan. 30, 1995), Rule 95
(stating that evidence may not be obtained by means contrary to internationally protected
human rights).
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convention."6 The Tribunal also has adopted rules governing the
detention of persons awaiting trial or appeal that conform to
United Nations standards."7
Whereas the Nuremberg Tribunal was established for the
purpose of trying only major war criminals, the jurisdiction of the
ICTY is not so restricted. The ICTY has jurisdiction over all
crimes constituting "serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.""' Under the Statute, these violations are
investigated and adjudicated by an international criminal justice
system consisting of three principal organs: the Chambers
(including three Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber), the
Prosecutor, and the Registry."9 The Chambers organ, which
performs the adjudicatory function of the Tribunal, was designed
to ensure full respect for the rights of the accused, the effective
performance of judicial functions, preservation of the international
character of the institution, and the efficient administration of
justice.'2 ° The Chambers organ consists of eleven independent
judges from different States who preside over the entire trial, from
the pretrial phase to the appeal. 2' The Office of the Prosecutor
performs the investigatory role of the Tribunal, investigating,
116 Id. at Rule 101 (stating that the highest penalty to be imposed is imprisonment
for life).
"7 See JONES, supra note 34, at 100-01, 104-05, 217, 222-30. Some preliminary
remarks are necessary to this analysis of the International Criminal Procedure for the
Former Yugoslavia. Generally speaking, the literature related to this subject is not as
developed as the work on substantive international criminal law. The commentaries of
the RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA are not sufficient for a deep and complete analysis of this
subject. To achieve a sufficient analysis, it is necessary to start with a solid
understanding of the domestic criminal procedure system and then apply the basic
principles of comparative criminal procedure. Thus, it is extremely important to focus on
the main differences between the Anglo-American system and the continental system.
See generally DAMASKA, supra note 38 (discussing comparative criminal procedure and
evidence law).
"' JONES, supra note 34, at 43.
119 Id. at 154.
120 J.P. Getti & K. Lescure, Historique du foncionnement du Tribunal Penal
international pour l'ex-Yugoslavie, 1 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 233 (1996); A. Pdllet, supra
note 87, at 32.
121 See JONES, supra note 34, at 156-57.
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prosecuting, and preparing indictments of alleged criminals. 22
Both the Chambers and the Prosecutor are served by the Registry,
which is responsible for all administrative matters relating to the
International Tribunal.'23
In an attempt to balance efficiency concerns with the
requirements of due process, the Statute provides for three Trial
Chambers that may conduct proceedings simultaneously.2 4
Because the Statute does not provide for a separate judicial body
to review indictments, the Trial Chamber performs this and other
pretrial functions, such as issuing arrest warrants and other
orders. 5 The existence of three Trial Chambers makes it possible
for a case to be decided by a court that does not include the judge
who initially considered the indictment.'26 This preserves the
impartiality and independence of the Trial Chamber that hears and
decides the case, ensuring a decision based on the evidence
admitted at trial without the bias created by having the same body
confirm the charges contained in the indictment.' 7 The Trial
Chamber may convict only when the evidence establishes the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 8
The Statute provides for the right of appeal by creating two
levels of jurisdiction within the Chambers.2 9 This distinguishes the
Statute from the Nuremberg Charter, which did not provide for the
right of appeal to a higher judicial body. The Nuremberg Tribunal
was the highest court of international criminal law which made its
judgments final. Although the right to an appeal makes the judicial
122 Id. at 164-69.
123 Id. at 166. The use of different terms in different legal systems made the naming
of the institutional structure as a whole more difficult than the naming of its three
branches. The term "tribunal" was selected to encompass both the structure as a whole
and its component parts. The use of this term was based partly on the Nuremberg and
Tokyo precedents and partly on the desire to distinguish the ad hoc Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia from the efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court.
124 JONES, supra note 34, at 154-57. In 1993, there were only two Trial Chambers,
but a third was added in 1998. Id. at 40, 162.
125 Id. at 265-66.
126 REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE CRIMES COMMITTED
IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 22, 23-24 (1993).
127 Id.
128 See 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 6, at 223-93.
129 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 25; JONES, supra note 34, at 195-96.
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proceedings of the International Tribunal more expensive and
time-consuming, it is consistent with important developments in
human rights law since the Nuremberg trial. The right to appeal a
criminal conviction and sentence to "a higher court according to
law" is an internationally recognized human right. It has been
recognized by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, " ' which established a minimum standard of process, as
essential to guaranteeing a fair trial before any national or
international court or tribunal.
The office of the Prosecutor is an extremely important organ
within the International Tribunal."' Since the Prosecutor initiates
the proceedings before the Tribunal, she is probably the most
visible and most active of all its functionaries. She initiates the
investigation and prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the Former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.132 The
Prosecutor has discretion as to whether to prosecute or not and is
the sole arbiter of this matter.'33 She initiates the investigation ex
officio."' During the investigation phase, the Prosecutor has the
power to question suspects, victims, and witnesses, to collect
evidence, and to conduct on-site investigations.'35 In carrying out
these tasks, the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance
of the State authorities concerned.'36
If the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to
support a reasonable belief that a suspect committed an offense
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, she must prepare an
indictment.'37 Under Rule 47 "the indictment shall set forth the
130 JONES, supra note 34, at 195-96.
131 See Morten Bergsmo et al., The Prosecutors of the International Tribunals: The
Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, and the ICC
Compared in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 121,
127 (L. Arbour et al. eds., 2000); Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F.
507, 541 (1994).
132 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 16; JONES, supra note 34, at 164.
133 JONES, supra note 34, at 167-68.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 18; JONES, supra note 34, at 167-68.
131 JONES, supra note 34, at 167-68.
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name and particulars of the suspect, and a concise statement of the
facts of the case and of the crime with which the suspect is
charged."'38 The indictment may contain cumulative charges. Thus
within a single indictment, the accused may be charged either with
different facts, sometimes explained as alternatives, or with
different crimes.'39 For example, the accused may be charged with
having committed the crime directly, or with aiding or abetting, or
with not prohibiting the commission of the crime, or finally with
not punishing the perpetrator of the crime.' 0 The defense often
objects to this method of preparing the indictment on the basis of
vagueness or lack of information contained in the indictment."'
Nevertheless, the Trial Chambers have always stated that the
practice of alternative and cumulative charges is not forbidden
either by the Statute or by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.' 2
Consequently, the Prosecutor has never been obliged to set forth
the facts alleged in the indictments in a more specific way. '
138 Id. at 265.
139 Id. at 168-72, 265-69; see generally Prosecutor v. Rajic, IT-95-12-T, (ICTY
Aug. 23, 1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Martic, IT-95-1 I-T,
(ICTY July 25, 1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Tadic and
Borovnica, IT-94-1-T, (ICTY Dec. 14, 1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty;
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, (ICTY Apr. 25, 1997) available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Jesilic and Cesic, amended, IT-95-10-PT, (ICTY
Oct. 19, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
140 JONES, supra note 34, at 170.
"41 Id. at 168-72, 267-69; see also Michele Caianiello, II proceso penale nella
giustizia internazionale: casi giurisprudenziali dall'esperienza dei tribunali ad hoc, in
CRIMINI INTERNAZIONALI TRA Dirrro E GIUSTIZIA, supra note 87, at 137. See generally,
Prosecutor v. Dragonljub Kunarac, Decision on defence preliminary motion on the form
of the amended indictment, IT-96-23-PT (ICTY Oct. 21, 1998) available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic and others, Decision on defence
challenges to form of the indictment, IT-95-16-T (ICTY May 15, 1998) available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Decision on the motion by the accused
based on defects in the form of the indictment, IT-96-21-T (ICTY Nov. 15, 1996)
available at http://www.un.org/icty.
142 JONES, supra note 34, at 168-72, 267-69.
,43 Id. But see Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on the defence motion to dismiss the
indictment base upon defects in the form thereof (vagueness/lack of adequate notice of
charges), § 32 (ICTY Apr. 4, 1997) available at http://www/un.org/icty. The court stated
as follows:
Nothing prevents the Prosecutor from pleading an alternative
responsibility (Article 7(1) or 7(3) of the Statute), but the factual
allegations supporting either alternative must be sufficiently precise so
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Once prepared, the indictment is formally presented to a
reviewing judge.'" The purpose of the review is to distinguish
meritorious from nonmeritorious cases.' 5 A meritorious case
establishes a prima facie case.' 6 Upon confirmation of an
indictment, the judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused.' 7 Upon arrest and transfer to
the seat of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor must bring the accused for
arraignment before a Trial Chamber without delay.4 ' Under Rule
62, the Trial Chamber must satisfy itself that the accused's right to
counsel has been respected."' The court then reads the indictment
to the accused in a language that she speaks and understands.'50
The court next calls upon the accused to enter a plea of guilty or
not guilty.'' If the accused pleads not guilty, the Registrar sets a
trial date.'52 If the accused pleads guilty, and the Trial Chamber is
satisfied that the guilty plea was informed, made voluntarily, not
equivocal, and supported by a sufficient factual basis, then the
Registrar will set a date for the presentencing hearing. '
According to Article 21 of the ICTY Statute, the accused is
entitled to the guarantees recognized by the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.'54 These rights include the right to be
presumed innocent, to be informed of the charges, the right to
counsel, the right to examine witnesses or to have them examined
as to permit the accused to prepare his defense on either or both
alternatives. The required level of precision is important, if only in
order to permit the accused to demonstrate the impossibility of being
held responsible both directly for his own deeds and indirectly those of
his subordinates.
Id. (emphasis added).
144 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 19; JONES, supra note 34, at 168, 172.
145 JONES, supra note 34, at 172-73.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 178-79.




153 Id. at 312, 317.
154 Id. at 178-79.
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and the right to be tried in his or her presence. ' The Statute does
not, however, include the right to a trial by jury.16 Rather, the trial
is decided by the professional judges elected to serve in the
Chambers.'57 "The absence of a jury reduces the need for elaborate
rules limiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence, requiring
original documents, or excluding evidence as unduly
prejudicial."'58 Thus, the ICTY, which is not bound by national
rules of evidence and which may admit any relevant evidence
deemed to have probative value,'59 permits the admission of
hearsay evidence."'° Previous statements by the accused and other
witnesses, even those gathered by the Prosecutor during the
investigation phase, have been admitted without cross-
examination by the defense attorney. 6'
As with the Nuremberg Tribunal, the procedural model built
by the ICTY Statute and the ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence can be characterized as an "intermediate solution"
between the continental and the Anglo-American systems. First,
the ICTY allows methods of gathering evidence for trial other than
cross-examination and confrontation.'62 Second, the Prosecutor is a
judicial officer with the same status as the judges, as in Italy,
France, Germany and most of Continental Europe. 63 Third, the
trial in absentia is banned and the "reasonable doubt" standard is
established." ' Finally, cross-examination is one of the main tenets
of the trial, as prescribed by both the ICTY Statute and Rules.
155 ICTY Statute, supra note 81, art. 21; JONES, supra note 34, at 178-79.
156 See JONES, supra note 34, at 178-79.
151 Id. at 156-58.
158 REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 126, at 26-27; see
generally DAMASKA, supra note 38, at 35-36 (discussing the differences between the
Anglo-American and Continental rules of evidence).
159 JONES, supra note 34, at 410.
160 Id. at 412-15.
161 Id.; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-1-T (ICTY May 7, 1997)
available at http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Delalic et. al., IT-96-2 1-T (ICTY Nov.
16, 1998) available at http://www.un.org/icty.
162 JONES, supra note 34, at 402-03.
163 Id. However, it is necessary to observe that not all common law systems provide
for a Prosecutor with a different status. For example, in Scotland and in South Africa the
prosecutor is a judicial officer and does not depend on the executive power.
164 JONES, supra note 34, at 178, 407.
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C. Final Considerations: From the Ad Hoc Tribunal to the
International Criminal Court
The close link existing between the ad hoc tribunals and the
International Criminal Court (ICC) is evident in an analysis of the
ICC legal materials. As with the international tribunals, the ICC
was established by means of a statute.' 5 The statute is the
fundamental charter of the ICC, outlining the general lines of
criminal law and procedure to be applied.'66 The details are left to
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which shall enter into force
upon adoption of a two-thirds majority of the members of the
Assembly of States Parties.
The structure of the ICC is similar to that of the International
Tribunals. Its organs are the Presidency, the Chambers (including
a Pre-Trial Chamber), the Office of the Prosecutor, and the
Registry.'67 The seat of the Court will be at the Hague in the
Netherlands.'68
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are in principle
the same as those referred to in the ICTY Statute: genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes including grave breaches of the
Geneva Convention of 1949."69 The crime of aggression is also
within the Court's jurisdiction.' 0 The crime of apartheid, meaning
inhumane acts committed in an institutional regime of oppression
by one racial group over another, is also included among the
crimes against humanity."' War crimes are defined in a more
detailed way.' 2 The crime of aggression is subject to a later
definition by the Assembly of States Parties, to be adopted by a
two-thirds majority. Further elements of other crimes are to be
defined by the Assembly with the same procedure. The ICC's
criminal process, particularly the conduct of investigations, trials,
and appeals, is similar to the proceedings established by and
165 GLOBAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL COLLECTION 68 (J. Oppenheim & W. van der
Wolf eds. 2000).
166 Id. at 67-140.
167 Id. at 86.
168 Id. at 68.
169 Id. at 69-75.
171 Id. at 69.
'7' Id. at 69-70.
172 Id. at 71-75.
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experimented with in front of the International Tribunal.
The enforcement of criminal law by the International Criminal
Court is likely to be as effective and fair as that enacted by the
International Tribunals. It may even be better if the International
Court takes heed of the errors and the defects of the Tribunals'
past experiences. This possibility is not so remote, given that many
of the officers operating in the International Tribunals are likely to
be appointed to the permanent International Criminal Court.
IV. The Process Before the Permanent International Criminal
Court: A General Overview
A. The Procedural Model
In 1998, the Rome Conference approved the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute will enter into force after the deposit of the
sixtieth instrument of ratification. 17'
When working with systems established by international
charters, a procedure expert first must confront and understand the
type of procedural model at issue. The procedure designed for the
ad hoc International Tribunals shows the peculiar necessity of
merging the different characteristics of systems far removed, if not
diametrically opposed, from one another. It is necessary to find
intermediate solutions that in some measure satisfy people
'73 See K. Ambos, The Legal Basis for an ICC, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 131, at 3; A. Marchesi, La
corte penale internazionale: ruolo della corte e ruolo degli stati, in CRIMINI
INTERNAZIONALI TRA DIRITrO E GIUSTIZIA, supra note 87, at 27; A. Cassese, The Statute
of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
144 (1999); G. Vassalli, Statuto di Roma. Note sull'istituzione di una corte penale
internazionale, 261 RIVISTA Di STUDI POLITICI INTERNAZIONALI 9 (1999); M. Politi, La
Cour Pinale Intrnationale, 4 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 818
(1999); D. Sarooshik, The Statute of the International Criminal Court, 48 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 401 (1999); see also COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (F. Lattanzi & W. Schabas eds., 2000); COMMENTARY
ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 56; [3 Enforcement] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999).
174 The United States has neither subscribed nor ratified the Statute. See P.
Malanczuk, The International Criminal Court and Landmines: What Are the
Consequences of Leaving the US behind?, I I EUR. J. INT'L L. 77 (2000); Ruth
Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
93 (1999); G. Hafner, K. Boon, A. Rubesame and J. Huston, A Response to the American
View as Presented by Ruth Wedgwood, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 108 (1999).
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accustomed to reasoning and acting according to continental or
civil law systems, on the one hand, and common law systems, on
the other.' A compromise procedure must be reached because the
perspective from which the rules are examined will color final
assessment. To a continental jurist, a process such as the one built
by the Rome Statute seems to be a common law process, while
common law jurists characterize it as a civil law process. The
more accurate conclusion is that the merger of models has
produced a result that cannot be entirely ascribed to one system or
the other.
Although it opens the way for some inconsistencies at the
systematic level, the blending of these two systems reveals that the
common denominator for any process is fairness. The process
must also comply with the fundamental principles laid down by
the international covenants on human rights. The Rome Statute
regularly references several international charters of rights,
reproduces provisions drawn from the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and generally recognizes principles of
international law relating to the rights of the person.'76
These references show the intention to build a process that
provides strong guarantees for the accused and creates a system
that could serve as a model, even in an ethical sense, for the
international community.'77 These goals, however, have not been
fully achieved. The rules adopted actually include many
questionable points and unsolved problems, especially from the
formalistic viewpoint of a procedural expert. Several gaps exist
with respect to the protections provided to the accused. Also, the
definitions of certain legal issues are often insufficient or
M ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 126, 37 I.L.M. at 1068; see generally M.R.
DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note 38; M.R.
Damaska, Structure of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,; M.R.
DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 38; J. Goldschmidt, Principios Generales
Del Proceso, in 2 PROBLEMAS JURIDICOS Y POLITICOS DEL PROCESO PENAL 109-119
(1961).
In Italy there is a vast literature on the differences between the accusatorial and
inquisitorial system. See generally supra note 38.
176 Helen Brady, Rules of Evidence and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON THE ICC 1, 4 (F. Lattanzi & W. Schabas
eds. 1999).
177 Id. at 3.
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inaccurate.
The Rome Statute contains only a general outline of the
criminal process before the ICC. The Statute deals only with the
most significant points, while the detailed code of procedure will
be issued later in the form of Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as
happened with the ad hoc International Tribunals.' With the ICC,
the procedure rules will be of conventional origin because the
contracting States will need to approve them. This system differs
from that used on previous occasions. For instance, with the
ICTY, the Tribunal itself issued the procedural rules. Issuing
formal law from the tribunal conforms with proceedings familiar
to common law systems, but is unusual for civil law countries.
Examination of the powers of the ICC as defined by the Rome
Statute reveals a broad discretion reserved to both the Prosecutor
and the Court itself. As with common law systems, the ICC is not
strictly bound to peremptory rules of procedural law and can adopt
evaluations tending to verify whether the immediate proceedings
constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial.' Civil law
systems, on the contrary, operate according to formal criteria of
validation of procedural acts. In other words, the control given to
the judge is used exclusively to ascertain whether the act was done
in conformity with the form provided for by law. If a violation
occurred, the civil law system does not provide for the judge to
inquire as to whether actual prejudice resulted. '
B. Relationship Between International Rules and Internal
Law
The ICC also requires an interdisciplinary approach in areas
where procedural law, substantive criminal law, and international
law overlap. At the same time, it is necessary to coordinate the
rules governing the processes before the ICC and the internal law
of the contracting States.
A meaningful example concerns the problem of cooperation of
each State with the International Criminal Court.8 ' The ICC has
178 Id. at 1-2.
179 Id. at 12.
180 See M.R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY, supra note
38, at 186-226.
181 See Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview, and
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the authority to request that a State execute certain acts or take
particular measures. '82 Questions arise as to what happens when
the requested act, or the manner in which its execution should be
carried out, is not permitted under the internal law of the State.
The Rome Statute, in a general way, provides for some forms of
settlement in the event of a conflict between a request from the
ICC and the internal procedural law.'83 Article 99 of the Statute
reads as follows: "Requests for assistance shall be executed in
accordance with the relevant procedure under the law of the
requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner
specified in the request.""'8 This means that if a positive
prohibition to execute the act or to execute it in the specified
manner does not exist, a departure from the internal law must be
allowed.
Moreover, a particular proceeding is provided to foster
agreement between the State and the Court on the execution of a
request. In the end, however, if the conflict is insuperable, the
internal law prevails. Attention must be paid to Article 88 of the
Rome Statute, which provides that national laws shall be enacted
to provide assistance to the ICC: "States Parties shall ensure that
there are procedures available under their national law for all the
forms of cooperation which are specified [in the Rome Statute]."'' 5
In other words, internal law must establish how to comply with
requests for cooperation from the ICC. An example of this type of
enabling law was enacted in Italy in 1994, in relation to the ad hoc
ICTY.'86 This Italian statute contains a provision that could be
useful in guiding the establishment of the relationship between the
jurisdictions of the ICC and the Italian courts. According to
Article 10 of the statute, the execution of the acts required by the
ICTY is governed by the rules of the Italian code of criminal
procedure, except where there is a need to comply with the forms
expressly required by the ICTY, so long as those provisions are
Cooperation with States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING
LEGISLATION 45, 86 (1999).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 90.
184 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 99, 37 I.L.M. at 1059-60.
185 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 88, 37 I.L.M. at 1052.
186 G. Vassalli, supra note 28, at 335.
20011
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
not contrary to the principles of Italy's legal system. '
This statute establishes the machinery for settlement of
potential conflicts. In most instances, the Italian law applies. The
ICTY may, however, give specific instructions, which, according
to Article 10, must be observed.'88 These instructions are
applicable even if they deviate from the rules of the Italian code of
criminal procedure. However, ICTY action is not permitted if it
contradicts the principles of the Italian legal system.'89
Despite provisions of this type, conflict of law problems
persist, especially in determining the principles of a State's legal
system. For example, a request from the ICTY should be denied if
it requires the execution of an activity contrary to the Italian
Constitution. Moreover, determining what violates the Italian
Constitution is a matter of interpretation. Often, however, Italian
law provides sufficiently precise guidelines to handle requests of
cooperation by international courts.
C. Prosecution
One of the most significant and politically relevant aspects of
ICC procedure concerns the responsibility for prosecution.19° The
Rome Statute provides that when a crime falling within the
jurisdiction of the Court is committed, the situation may be
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council of the United
Nations 9' or by a State Party.'92 Moreover, the Prosecutor can
initiate an investigation upon receipt of any information about the
crime.'93 The acknowledgment of the power to launch ex officio
investigations was particularly valued by non-governmental
organizations supporting the establishment of the ICC in order to
avoid State interference with the Prosecutor's actions. The
Security Council does, however, have the power to obtain the
187 Art. 10, para. 4, L. Feb. 14, 1994, n. 120, published in Gazzetta Ufficiale Feb. 22,
1994, 5 n.43.
188 Id.
189 See G. Vassalli, supra note 28, at 337.
190 S. ZappalA., II Prosecutor della Corte penale internazionale: luci e ombre,
RiVISTA Di DiRITro INTERNAZIONALE 39 (1999).
191 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art.13, 37 I.L.M. at 1010-11.
192 Id. art. 14, 37 I.L.M. at 1011.
'93 Id. art. 15, 37 I.L.M. at 1011.
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deferral of an investigation or prosecution by adopting a resolution
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.'94 Chapter
VII applies when peace and international security are
endangered. 9 '
The ICC determines the admissibility of a case based either on
its own motion or on challenge by the accused or by a qualified
State.'96 Article 17 of the Rome Statute outlines the numerous
conditions for admissibility.'97
The most important of these conditions are those related to the
central principle of complementarity... contained in the Preamble
and in Article 1 of the Rome Statute.' Complementarity refers to
the relationship between the jurisdiction of the ICC and the
jurisdiction of the national courts of the States Parties.2 ° The
national criminal jurisdiction has priority over the jurisdiction of
the ICC, unless the State is unwilling or unable to prosecute the
crime. Therefore, the ICC has no jurisdiction if the case is being
investigated or has been investigated by the State.2"' The same
principle applies to ne bis in idem (protection against double
jeopardy). No person shall be tried before the court if already
convicted or acquitted for the same conduct by the Court itself, or
by another court (such as a national one)."' The case is admissible
before the Court, however, when the national proceedings either
were held to shield the accused from criminal responsibility or
were not conducted independently or impartially."3
A different situation occurs when the case is not considered
sufficiently grave to justify further action by the Court. This is not
an issue of admissibility, however, but rather a judgment on the
194 Id. art. 16, 37 I.L.M. at 1012.
195 U.N. CHARTER, ch. VII.
196 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 19, 37 I.L.M. at 1013-14.
197 Id. art. 17, 37 I.L.M. at 1012.
198 See Broomhall, supra note 182, at 79-82; S. ZappalA, supra note 191, at 42. On
this subject, see also all the authors mentioned above, supra note 174.
199 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, Preamble & art. 1, 37 I.L.M. at 1002-03.
200 Broomhall, supra note 182, at 79.
201 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1012; see also
Broomhall, supra note 182, at 81.
202 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 20, 37 I.L.M. at 1014-15.
203 Id. art. 20(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1014-15.
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merits of the case, albeit a provisional one. As with the
aforementioned situations, this decision may be reviewed at the
request of the Prosecutor when new facts arise. 4
Prosecution before the ICC is based on the principle of
opportunity,"' in contrast to procedures in some European
countries, such as Germany and Italy, which base prosecution on
the principle of legality.0" Mandatory prosecution is inconsistent
with the scope of jurisdiction granted to the ICC. Every crime that
falls within ICC jurisdiction is not expected to be tried. Therefore,
it is necessary for the Prosecutor to have the power to select the
individuals to be indicted and the charges to be brought.
The problem is that the Prosecutor's discretion is extremely
broad and may prove difficult to control. The Prosecutor may
refrain from initiating an investigation if the legal or factual basis
is lacking,"' or if, "[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime
and the interests of [the] victims," there are "substantial reasons to
believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of
justice.""2 ° Although it is clear that this provision represents an
indispensable safety valve for the Prosecutor's actions, it also
204 Id. art. 19(10), 37 I.L.M. at 1014.
205 See Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision
in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 244
(1977) (explaining that the principle of opportunity provides that the "prosecuting
attorney shall receive complaints and denunciations and decide what to do with them"
(quoting THE FRENCH CODE OF CIV. P. art. 40)); see also FRANK MILLER, PROSECUTION:
THE DECISION To CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969) (analyzing decision-making
power of prosecutors based on the report of the American Bar Foundation's survey of the
administration of justice in the United States); W.R. La Fave, The Prosecutor's
Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970) (discussing the broad
range of largely uncontrolled discretion exercised by prosecutors in the United States;
see generally MARIO CHIVARAIO, L'AZIONE PENALE TRA DIRITTO E POLITICA, (1995);
FERRAJOLI, supra note 38, at 579-83.
206 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 206, at 247 (explaining that the principle of
legality "makes prosecution compulsory and discretion in charging impermissible unless
specifically authorized by statute"); see also Andrew Ashworth, The "Public Interest"
Element in Prosecutions, CRIM. L. REV. 595, 595 (1987) (developing the element of
England's Code for Crown Prosecutors that inquires "whether the public interest requires
a prosecution"); see generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN
EVALUATIVE STUDY (1994); CHIAVARIO, supra note 206; FERRAJOLI, supra note 38, at
579-83.
207 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 53(l)(a), 37 L.L.M. at 1029.
208 Id. art. 53 (1)(c), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
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grants the Prosecutor power that is almost absolute and essentially
makes her the fundamental organ of the ICC.2°9 Because the judge
may act only if the Prosecutor pursues the case, the Prosecutor is
the master of the process. She holds the key to its triggering
mechanism. There is no question about the utility of discretionary
power, but the discretion here is extremely broad and allows the
Prosecutor to make evaluations that, strictly speaking, go beyond
the task of prosecuting crimes.
In this context the Prosecutor clearly holds a great deal of
power with remarkable political significance. Thus, the rules
regulating the qualification and selection of the Prosecutor are
essential, as is the institutional position of the Prosecutor's Office.
According to the terms of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor shall
be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the
Assembly of States Parties," ° and shall be a person "of high moral
character.""2 ' The Office of the Prosecutor "shall act independently
as a separate organ of the Court., 21 2 Therefore the Office belongs
to the ICC, but is separated from the judges. The members of the
Office of the Prosecutor "shall not seek or act on instructions from
any external source., 213 This provision refers, above all, to external
influence by the States.
Judges may review the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate an
investigation or prosecution where the Prosecutor believes that the
interests of justice would not be served. These judges, who sit in
the Pre-Trial Chamber that supervises the preliminary
investigations, exercise limited control over the Prosecutor's
discretion .2 " The Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of
her determination not to initiate an investigation if it is based
solely on the evaluation of "the interests of justice.""21 The
209 See Leila Sadat Wexler, A First Look at the 1998 Rome Statutefor a Permanent
International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, Structure and Referrals
to the Court, in [3 ENFORCEMENT] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 173, at
673.
210 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 42(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1024.
211 Id. art.42(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1024.
212 Id. art 42(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1024.
213 Id,
214 Id. art. 53, 37 I.L.M. at 1029-30.
215 Id. art. 53(2)(c), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
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Prosecutor must also inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of a
conclusion that there is no basis to prosecute and give reasons for
this decision.2 6 In the latter case, the Prosecutor must also report
the information to the State or the Security Council that referred
the crime.27 The Pre-Trial Chamber, at the request of the State or
the Security Council, may review the decision of the Prosecutor
and may request that the Prosecutor reconsider it. In addition, the
Pre-Trial Chamber may review the Prosecutor's decision on its
own initiative, in which case the decision will be effective only if
confirmed. t8
The Statute does not specify the consequences of non-
confirmation. In the Italian system, when the judge does not grant
leave to dismiss a case, she can order the prosecutor to file an
indictment. A solution like that, however, would be atypical in a
system where the prosecution is based on the principle of
opportunity. Additionally, that solution would probably be
inconsistent with the Prosecutor's independence from the judges,
as is expressly provided for by the Rome Statute. But even when
the Prosecutor is simply invited to reconsider her decision, it is not
clear to what extent a discretionary choice is still allowed.
Apparently, a legal solution does not exist. On one hand, the
judge is not empowered to order the prosecution to bring an action
and, on the other hand, the review of the Prosecutor's decision
must have consequence. The only reasonable resolution is a
political one. If the conflict with the Pre-Trial Chamber is
insuperable, the Prosecutor may be forced to resign, since she can
neither ignore the judge's opinion nor be forced to take action.1 9
D. Preliminary Investigations
Preliminary investigations are carried out by the Prosecutor. A
peculiar feature, reminiscent of civil law systems, is found in
Article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute: the Prosecutor "in order to
establish the truth, [shall] extend the investigation to cover all
facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is
... criminal responsibility ... and, in doing so, [shall] investigate
216 RoME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 53(2)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
217 Id. art. 53(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
218 Id. art. 53(2)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1029.
219 See Broomhall, supra note 182, at 68-71.
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incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally."22 In other
words, the Prosecutor is bound to be objective and to discover the
truth, similar to the investigating judge (judge d'instruction) used
in the French and other continental systems. 22 At least in theory,
Italian prosecutors are also required to be impartial, but practically
this means only that they must not disregard evidence favorable to
the suspect when investigating crimes and charging the accused.
In particular, the Prosecutor has the power to collect evidence,
to question victims, witnesses, and persons being investigated, to
request the usually indispensable cooperation of any State, and to
conclude relevant agreements with the States.222 Confidential
information must be kept secret and protective measures may be
used for this purpose.23 Measures may also be taken to ensure the
protection of any person and the preservation of evidence.2
The Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber when an
investigation is deemed to present "a unique opportunity... which
may not be available subsequently" to take testimony or collect
evidence. 25 The Pre-Trial Chamber may then take necessary
measures to collect or preserve evidence and, in particular, to
protect the rights of the defense. 26 Attendance of counsel must be
authorized and is, therefore, not automatically provided.227
Moreover, the Rome Statute does not set in advance the
procedures to be followed, including obligation to make a record.
These procedures are determined on a case-by-case basis at the
discretion of the Pre-Trial Chamber. 28 The Pre-Trial Chamber
may, however, act on its own initiative, in consultation with the
Prosecutor, to take measures required to preserve evidence
essential for the defense at trial.229
With regards to coercive measures, such as arrest warrants, the
220 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 54(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1030.
221 Zappal, supra note 191, at 48.
222 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 54(3)(a-d), 37 I.L.M. at 1030.
223 Id. art. 54(3)(e), 37 I.L.M. at 1030.
224 Id. art. 54(3)(f), 37 I.L.M. at 1030.
225 Id. art. 56(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1031; see also Broomhall, supra note 182, at 71.
226 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 56, 37 I.L.M. at 1031-32.
227 Id. art. 56(2)(d), 37 I.L.M. at 1032.
228 Id. art. 56(2-3), 37 I.L.M. at 1031-32.
229 Id. art. 56(3)(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1032.
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Prosecutor has no independent powers and must act through
application to the Pre-Trial Chamber.230 An arrest warrant may be
issued when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
person committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC and
the arrest is necessary to meet one of the following conditions: to
ensure the person's appearance at trial, to prevent the person from
obstructing or endangering the investigation or trial, or to prevent
the person from continuing the commission of that or a related
crime.23 ' A summons may be substituted for an arrest warrant when
there are reasonable grounds to believe that it will be sufficient to
ensure the person's appearance.232
The Pre-Trial Chamber exerts all subsequent control on the
coercive measures adopted and may act on its own initiative in
doing so. It may release a detainee, with or without conditions, and
it must periodically review its rulings on releases and detentions.233
In particular, because the Statute does not provide for a time limit
of pre-trial detention, the Pre-Trial Chamber "shall ensure that a
person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior to trial due
to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor.'
234
E. Indictment and Confirmation
On the basis of the arrest warrant, the Court may request either
the provisional arrest or the arrest and surrender of an individual.3
The arrest warrant is executed by the State that receives the
request in accordance with its duty of cooperation with the ICC.236
The national judicial authority may determine only whether the
warrant has been lawfully issued and may not review the merits of
the case or the substantive grounds for the Court's decision.
Within a reasonable time after the person's surrender or
voluntary appearance before the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall
hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor
230 Id. art 58(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1033.
231 Id.
232 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 58(7), 37 I.L.M. at 1034.
233 Id. art. 60, 37 I.L.M. at 1035.
234 Id. art. 60(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1035.
235 Id. art. 58(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1034.
236 Id. art. 59(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1034.
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intends to seek trial. 237 The Rome Statute, however, does not
specify which office initiates the hearing. It is also not clear
exactly when the process moves from the investigation phase to
the prosecution phase. The time frame is not set in which the
Prosecutor, after closing the investigation, must decide whether to
file an indictment or dismiss the case.
Apparently, the request of a warrant of arrest or a summons to
appear should always lead to a confirmation hearing. At a
confirmation hearing, the Prosecutor has to file the charges on
which he intends to bring the suspect to trial.238 Logically then, the
prosecution begins with the appearance of the individual before
the judge. However, the Rome Statute does not state that the
charges must be related to the same crime alleged in the
application for the warrant, and no indication is made as to what
happens if the application has been rejected.
By contrast, the current procedure for the ICTY is more
straightforward. " If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor is satisfied
that there is sufficient evidence, she prepares and submits to the
judge an indictment for confirmation, regardless of the suspect's
position.24° Upon confirmation, the judge may issue an arrest
warrant."' If the Prosecutor seeks provisional detention of the
suspect during the investigation, a provisional charge must be
submitted to the judge.4
The uncertainty with which the Rome Statute outlines the
methods of charging and the beginning of the prosecution most
237 Id. art. 61(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1035.
238 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 61(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
239 M. Bergsmo et al., The Prosecutors of Yugoslavia, in THE LEGAL BASIS FOR AN
ICC 121-55 (L. Arbour et al. eds., 1988); Nsereko, supra note 130, at 541; see generally
Prosecutor v. Dragonljub Kunarac, Decision on Defence Preliminary Motion on the
Form of the Amended Indictment, IT-96-23-PT (ICTY Oct. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et. al., Decision on Defence Challenges
to Form of the Indictment, IT-95-16-T, (ICTY May 15, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Decision on the Motion by the
Accused Based on Defects in the Form of the Indictment, IT-96-21-T (ICTY Oct. 2,
1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; see generally JONES, supra note
34, at 181-188; Caianiello, supra note 141, at 137.
240 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 61, 37 I.L.M. at 1035-37.
241 See id. art. 61(11), 37 I.L.M. at 1037.
242 Id. art. 60, 37 I.L.M. at 1035.
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likely stem from the need to reconcile competing interests. The
Statute attempts to guarantee the defendant's rights while at the
same time protecting the indictment so that the accused does not
have the opportunity to evade trial by escaping to a State incapable
of or not obliged to cooperate with the ICC. It is essential,
therefore, that the presence of the individual be ensured so that the
confirmation hearing may be held. This normally happens through
the arrest of the person, though other measures are possible if
necessary to obtain her appearance.
A reasonable conclusion is that the charges can be brought
only against a person under arrest or summons. This means that if
charges are brought, the Pre-Trial Chamber has already made a
preliminary evaluation of the evidence to establish reasonable
grounds to believe that the person has committed the crimes. On
the contrary, if the warrant of arrest or the summons has been
denied, the Prosecutor cannot bring charges against the individual.
The confirmation hearing takes place in the presence of the
Prosecutor, the person charged and her counsel.243 The suspect
must be informed in advance of the charges and of the evidence on
which the Prosecutor intends to rely.244 At the hearing, the suspect
may object to the charges, challenge the evidence presented by the
Prosecutor, and present evidence on her behalf.24' As for the
Prosecutor, she may rely on documentary or summary evidence
and is not required to call witnesses.4 6 If it is satisfied that "there is
sufficient evidence to establish substantial ground to believe that
the person committed each of the crimes charged," the Pre-Trial
Chamber confirms the charges and commits the person to a Trial
Chamber for trial.4 7
The hearing can be held in the absence of the person charged
only if she has waived the right to be present, or if she has fled or
cannot be found, meaning a warrant or a summons was issued
having no effect.4 8 If the suspect has fled or cannot be found, all
reasonable steps must have been taken to secure her appearance
243 Id. art. 61(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1035.
244 Id. art. 61(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
245 Id. art. 61(6), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
246 RoME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 61(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
247 Id. art. 61(7), 37 I.L.M. at 1037-38; Broomhall, supra note 182, at 72.
248 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 61(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1036.
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and to inform her of the hearing and the charges.49 In such cases,
the absent person may be represented by counsel, but this right is
subject to discretionary review by the Pre-Trial Chamber to
determine whether it is in the interest of justice. °
F. The Trial Stage and the Admission of Evidence
The trial before the Trial Chamber shall be held in the
presence of the accused. The accused can be removed by the Court
only if she disrupts the trial. In that situation, she shall be allowed
to observe the trial and instruct counsel from outside the
courtroom, even if the use of communications technology is
required to do so.25' Trial in absentia (without the presence of the
accused) is not allowed. This provision is a feature usually
ascribed to common law systems, although it is present elsewhere
as well. Trial in absentia is considered to be a violation of the
defendant's right to confrontation.252 Additionally, trials shall be
held in public unless the Court decides that the proceedings should
be held in closed session to protect confidential information,
victims, witnesses or even the accused.253
The presentation of evidence is, in principle, up to the parties.
The Court rules on the relevance and admissibility of any evidence
according to criteria that ensure broad discretion. Criteria for these
rulings appear merely as an indication. Article 69 provides that the
Court shall take into account, among other things, "the probative
value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may
cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a
witness."25' These criteria imply an appraisal that mixes procedural
issues with a judgment on the merits, because in a trial before the
ICC, unlike with a jury trial, there is no separation of questions of
fact and questions of law. With regard to this, however, the Rome
Statute contains an explicit reference to the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, which are supposed to provide further
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. art 63, 37 I.L.M. at1037.
252 See P. Sob, The Dynamics of International Criminal Tribunal, 67 NORDIC J.
INT'LL. 139 (1998).
253 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 64(7), 37 I.L.M. at 1038.
254 Id. art. 69(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1042.
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specifications.
The Court has the power to admit evidence on its own
initiative. The Court has the authority to request the submission of
all evidence that it considers "necessary for the determination of
the truth." '255 Furthermore, it may "order the production of evidence
in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or presented
during the trial." '256 These powers may be seen as inquisitorial,
particularly because they are stated in generic terms without
reference to the results achieved on the basis of party initiative. As
a consequence, the judges' impartiality may be prejudiced.
Witnesses before the ICC give their testimony in person. 57
However, the Court may adopt measures to protect witnesses. 258
Such measures may vary from the previously mentioned exclusion
of the public, to the presentation of evidence by electronic or other
special means, to any other measure that the Court deems
appropriate under the circumstances.259 The measures chosen must
not be either prejudicial to the rights of the accused or inconsistent
with a fair and impartial trial.26o The Statute does not take a definite
position on the admissibility of anonymous testimony whereby a
person's identity is kept secret. This topic has been a controversial
issue for a long time. It seems that the question is left to a case-by-
case balancing between security needs and protection of the
defendant's rights, with the final determination made by the judge.
As for the exceptions to giving oral evidence, the Rome
Statute does provide for the admissibility of documents and
255 Id. art. 69(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1042.
256 Id. art. 64(6)(d), 37 I.L.M. at 1038.
257 Id. art. 69(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1041-42.
258 Id.art. 68, 37 I.L.M. at 1041 (providing court authority to protect the physical
and psychological condition of a witness through measures that may include increased
security, in camera hearings, and appropriate counseling); see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
Decision on the Application of the Prosecutor dated 17 Oct. 1996 requesting protective
measures for victims and witnesses, IT-95-14-T, (ICTY Nov. 5, 1996) available at
http://www.un.org/icty; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's motion
requesting protective measures for victims and witnesses, (IT-94-1-T), (ICTY Aug. 10,
1995) available at http://www.un.org/icty; Caianiello, supra note 142, at 151; Andre
Klip, Witnesses before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
67 INT'L REV. PENAL L. 267 (1996).
259 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 68, 37 I.L.M. at 1041.
260 Id. art. 68(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1041.
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written transcripts. 261 Nothing is stated about the use of previous
statements recorded by the Prosecutor as evidence, save further
reference to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. As already
stated, Article 56 of the Rome Statute allows the Pre-Trial
Chamber to take a deposition in the case of a unique opportunity
which may not be available subsequently. The admissibility and
probative value of this evidence will be weighed by the Trial
Chamber.262
Therefore, the question of admissibility of out of court
statements remains open. The Rome Statute provides little
guidance on evidence matters, making it necessary to await the
actual regulation resulting from the forthcoming Rules of
Procedure and Evidence. The rules adopted by the ICTY and their
judicial application allow a wide use at trial of statements recorded
during the investigation stage.2 63 The hearsay exclusion does not
strictly apply in that international tribunal.64
This decision has been justified with the explanation that, in
the absence of a jury, a Court composed only of professional
judges should be able to distinguish the probative value of the
different pieces of evidence and therefore should not run the risk
of overvaluing evidence not submitted to cross-examination.265
This explanation does not, however, take into account that the
Prosecutor carries out the questioning of witnesses whose
statements are recorded without the assistance of counsel. This
one-sided questioning certainly causes disparity between the
parties when that information is used as direct evidence at trial.
G. Exclusion of Evidence
With regard to the exclusion of evidence, the applicable rules
are more similar to that of civil law systems, where the Court also
sits without a jury as the trier of fact and determiner of the
admissibility of evidence. As in continental systems, including the
261 Id. art. 69(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1041-42.
262 Id. art. 56(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1032.
263 See Brady, supra note 177, at 14.
264 See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Decision on the Motion of the
Prosecutor for the Admissibility of Evidence, IT-96-21-T (ICTY Jan. 19, 1998) available
at http://www.un.org/icty.
265 Brady, supra note 177, at 15.
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Italian one, the Rome Statute provides that the decision of the
Trial Chamber "shall contain a full and reasoned statement of the
... findings on the evidence and conclusions." '266 In other words,
the decision should include an explanation of the reasons for the
admission and exclusion of evidence.
The rules of exclusion, however, are not peremptory, as they
are subject to a discretionary evaluation by the judge. The
violation of a legal prescription does not suffice to exclude
evidence, because it is necessary to verify that the violation has
actually caused harm.267 Consequently, the rule is more flexible
and in some respects more functional because it allows the judge
to disregard violations deemed to be insignificant. This approach
differs substantially from a formal system, like the Italian one, that
incorporates predefined violations and correspondent procedural
remedies. From a continental point of view, entrusting the decision
entirely to a judge's discretion weakens the certainty of the rules
and the predictability of their effects, making it more difficult to
prepare a defense strategy.
Two of the exclusion criteria contained in Article 69 overlap
with each other in providing certain procedural protections.268
Evidence unlawfully obtained shall not be admissible if: "(a) [t]he
violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence;
or (b) [t]he admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings." '269 The
first provision requires that the outcome be taken into account, so
that the evidence is excluded if the violation of the rules makes it
unreliable. This provision acts as a safeguard for the rightness of
the judgment. The second provision recognizes the necessity of
protecting the rights of the parties, and in particular the
fundamental rights of the individual, by limiting the exercise of
penal jurisdiction powers. For example, a coerced confession
should be excluded on grounds of unreliability. Even if it would be
reliable, however, it should still be excluded, because its
admission would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings.
266 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 74(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1045.
267 Brady, supra note 177, at 12.
268 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 69(7), 37 I.L.M. at 1042.
269 Id.
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The procedural rules incorporated into the Rome Statute arise
from numerous sources. The first of the rules to be complied with
are those contained in the Rome Statute itself. The Rome Statute
outlines several principles regarding the presentation of evidence,
with the expectation that they will be more fully defined by the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Statute rules guaranteeing
the rights of the accused are particularly relevant in this context.
Another source of procedural rules is the phrase
"internationally recognized human rights," with specific reference
to the rights set forth in the international charters on human
rights. 7 ° However, with the criminal process such guarantees have
been almost entirely acknowledged within the Rome Statute, so
that this particular provision has little more than residual value.
At first glance, it would appear that possible violations of the
national law of the state where evidence has been collected are
irrelevant to the workings of the ICC. Article 69(8) of the Rome
Statute precludes the Court from ruling on the application of a
state's national law.27' But this does not apply to national laws
intended to guarantee human rights. When a state's assistance is
requested, the taking of evidence is subject to national law. In case
of a conflict, the national law must prevail. This concept has been
formally articulated in the law of several continental countries
including Italy. Therefore, a procedure must be legal under a
state's domestic standards to be required by the ICC.
H. Rights of the Accused
Specific attention is devoted by the Rome Statute to
safeguarding the rights of the accused person, with reference both
to the investigations stage preceding the indictment, and to the
trial stage. The rights of the accused are essentially the same as
those recognized by international charters, in particular by the
1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Covenant). 72
According to the Covenant, the suspect is first entitled to the
270 Id.
271 Id. art. 69(8), 37 I.L.M. at 1042.
272 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/C 3/SR. (1966), 6
I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter Covenant]; see also Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparing the Ad
hoc Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia & The
Projectfor an International Criminal Court, 67 INT'L REv. OF PENAL L. 143, 195 (1996);
Wexler, supra note 209, at 675.
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privilege against self-incrimination, that is, he shall not be
"compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. ' 273
Moreover, the person shall not be subjected to torture or any other
form of inhuman or degrading treatment 274 nor shall she be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. 5 Under the Covenant,
the person has the following rights: to be informed of the of the
nature and cause of the charge against him; to have adequate time
to prepare a defense; to be tried without undue delay; to be tried in
his own presence with legal assistance of his choice or to have
legal assistance assigned, without cost if necessary; to examine
witnesses against him and obtain witnesses on his behalf; and to
have free assistance of an interpreter. 6 Some of these provisions
extend to the investigation stage the protections already afforded
persons charged with a crime.277
Like the Covenant, the Rome Statute affirms the presumption
of innocence of the accused, specifying (although this should be
implied) that the Prosecutor has the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused.278 The accused can be convicted only if the Court is
convinced of her guilt "beyond reasonable doubt.,
279
Article 67 of the Rome Statute repeats the 1966 Covenant's so-
called "minimum guarantees" for the accused at the trial stage 8°
Article 67(1) (a) through (g) reproduces, almost literally, the
corresponding provisions of the 1966 Covenant listed above: the
right of the accused to be informed promptly and in detail of the
charges, the right to have adequate time and facilities to prepare
the defense, the right to be tried without delay, the right to be
present at the trial and to have legal assistance, the right to
examine the witnesses against him and to obtain the examination
of witnesses on his behalf, the right to have the assistance of an
273 Covenent, supra note 273, art. 14(3)(g), 6 I.L.M. at 373.
274 Id. art. 7, 6 I.L.M. at 370.
275 Id. art. 9(1), 6 I.L.M. at 371.
276 Covenant, supra note 273, art. 14(3), 6 I.L.M. at 372-73.
277 Id. art. 14(3)(a), (d), 6 I.L.M. at 372-73
278 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 66(1-2), 37 I.L.M. at 1040; Covenant, supra
note 273, art. 14, para. 2.
279 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 66(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1040.
280 Id. art. 67, 37 I.L.M. at 1040-1041; Covenant, supra note 273, art. 14(3), 6
I.L.M. at 372-73.
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interpreter, and the right not to be compelled to testify or to
confess guilt.28' Additionally, the accused has "[t]he right to make
an unsworn oral or written statement in his/her defense" 282 and the
right not to have imposed any reversal of the burden of proof.283
According to a typical rule of common law systems, the
Statute provides for the Prosecutor to disclose evidence in her
possession to the defense as soon as is practicable. 84 However, the
Prosecutor must only disclose evidence that shows or tends to
show the innocence of the accused, mitigates the guilt of the
accused, or affects the credibility of prosecution evidence.285 These
particular acknowledgements represent new developments,
although they have been implied in previous provisions.
The victim is allowed only marginal participation in the
proceedings. Article 75 of the Rome Statute provides that the
Court shall have the power to rule on reparations to the victims,
including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. 86 The
Rome Statute does not, however, provide for a parte civile giving
victims the power to sue the defendant for damages as a party to
the criminal process, as is done in the French and Italian systems
among others. The participation of the victim is viewed with
disfavor because it would make the task of determining guilt and
innocence even more difficult and might prejudice the rights of the
accused. In fact, the Rome Statute provides that "[w]here the
personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall
permit their views and concerns to be presented... at stages of the
proceedings determined to be appropriate and in a manner which
is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused
and a fair and impartial trial." '287 In other words, victims do not
have the right to become a genuine party to the proceedings, but
they do have the right to be represented before the ICC.
281 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 67(1)(a-g), 37 I.L.M. at 1040.
282 Id. art. 67(1)(h), 37 I.L.M. at 1040.
283 Id. art. 67(1)(i), 37 I.L.M. at 1040.
284 Id. art. 67(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1040-41.
285 Id.
286 Id. art. 75(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1045.
287 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 68(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1041.
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L The Plea of Guilty
Finally, it is interesting to examine the ICC's handling of the
guilty plea. A plea of guilty permits the accused to end the trial by
making an admission of guilt.288 The wisdom of introducing this
option into proceedings before the ICC has been much disputed.
The guilty plea has been frequently criticized from an ethical as
well as juridical point of view, even in those countries where it is
permitted. It is usually justified on the practical grounds that it is
necessary to efficiently dispense with the courts' caseload. It is
commonly thought that a guilty plea, especially one accompanied
by a bargain with the prosecutor on the charges or the penalty,
would be inconsistent with the function of the ICC. The ICC is
designed to administer justice in a public and exemplary manner.
Additionally, it has the ability to select the cases it hears on the
basis of their seriousness and relevancy.
In the end, it was determined that the accused could not be
denied the ability to make an admission of guilt. The Rome
Statute, however, provides that the guilty plea must be approved
by the Court to result in an immediate conclusion of the
proceedings.289 First, the accused shall be afforded the opportunity
to make an admission of guilt or to plead not guilty.29° Where the
accused makes an admission of guilt, the Trial Chamber shall
assess the awareness and the voluntariness of the admission.29' It
may convict the accused of the crime only if "the admission of
guilt is supported by the facts of the case. ' 292 Without this sort of
corroboration, the admission of guilt will be treated as not having
been made and the trial will continue under the ordinary trial
procedures. 93
Moreover, the Trial Chamber may consider that "a more
complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the
288 Id. art. 65, 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
289 Id. art. 65(2), 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
290 Id. art. 64(8)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1038.
291 Id. art. 65(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1039; see also Olivia Swaak-Goldman, International
Decisions, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 282 (1998); David Turns, The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Erdemovic Case, 47 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 461
(1998).
292 ROME STATUTE, supra note 2, art. 65(1)(c), 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
293 Id. art. 65(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
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interests of justice." '294 In that case, it may request that the
Prosecutor present additional evidence or order that the trial be
continued under the ordinary trial procedures. 29" Therefore, even
when the accused makes a well-founded admission of guilt for the
purpose of avoiding a public trial, the Court may require the
accused to stand trial, remitting the case to another Trial Chamber
if necessary.
However, when the admission of guilt is accepted, no explicit
advantage is recognized to the accused, even though it is likely
that the admission will be taken into account in determining the
appropriate penalty. In particular, the Court is not bound to any
discussion between the Prosecutor and the defense regarding the
modification of charges or the penalty to be imposed. 296 These
provisions are quite significant because they outline a procedure
different from the traditional guilty plea of common law systems
based on negotiation with the prosecutor. This procedure also
varies from the Italian patteggiamento, where the reduction of the
penalty is predetermined by law and the judge can reject the
request of the parties if he is not satisfied with the agreement. It is,
in a sense, an intermediate situation: the accused, without
assurance of a milder sentence, chooses to avoid the trial with the
admission of guilt. Judicial approval, however, is always
necessary. This type of compromise between differing juridical
traditions is both a hallmark of and crucial to the establishment of
an effective International Criminal Court.
294 Id. art. 65(4), 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
295 Id.
296 Id. art.65(5), 37 I.L.M. at 1039.
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